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Over the course of Taiwan’s democratization, in response to the changing media environment 
brought about by liberalization, commercialization and technological change, politicians, 
social activists and election candidates have modified the ways in which they attempt to 
inform, persuade and mobilize citizens. The methods that diverse political actors use to 
communicate their preferences, delineate their positions relative to their competitors, explain 
their behaviours and attack their opponents have a substantial effect on the information 
environment available to voters, the tone of political discourse and political competition.  
Aside from the behaviour of political actors, the same processes have had a significant effect 
on all aspects of media production and consumption, and the behaviours and expectations of 
citizens. This article is an attempt to conceptualise the evolution of political communications 
from the start of democratization to the present and to assess the implications for public 
discourse, political participation and the vitality of Taiwan’s democracy.  
Taiwan is an illuminating case for studying the co-evolution of media and politics. 
Prior to the rescinding of 38-years of martial law in 1987 Taiwan was a textbook Cold-War 
anti-Communist dictatorship, with a highly circumscribed civil society, carefully managed 
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political competition and a constrained media-sphere. The three terrestrial TV channels were 
operated by the ruling party, the military, and the government. Cable TV and opposition radio 
stations were illegal. All newspapers were pro-regime, with no new licences issued after 1951. 
A rigorous censorship regime prevailed over the publication of magazines, books and music. 
A national language was imposed by the ruling Kuomintang (中國國民黨 , KMT) and 
Taiwan’s other languages disappeared from public spaces, including the media and schools. 
Contestation over media use and access was a significant feature of the transition to 
democracy. In the 1970s, when Taiwanese intellectuals began agitating for reforms, their 
voices were expressed in a range of independent periodicals, including the short-lived but 
influential Formosa Magazine (Meilidao 美麗島). The closure of Formosa and arrest of 
activists involved in its publication in 1979 was a watershed for Taiwan’s democratization 
movement, galvanizing the underground opposition and inspiring a generation of politicians 
who would later lead the Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步黨 DPP). The subsequent 
blooming of independent political magazines in the early 1980s led to commercial success 
and elevated the status of editors and writers, who often represented more radical tendencies 
in the opposition movement. The multiplication of street protests towards the end of the 
martial-law era were accompanied by a wave of documentary film production distributed on 
videotape, which challenged official narratives carried by state-run media. Taiwan’s pro-
democracy movement was partly a movement for alternative media, namely the creation of 
new spaces for social expression and “dissident” discourses that circumvented the state’s 
monopoly on information. The differentiated media-scape that emerged in the 1990s was thus 
one of the inherent and most visible achievements of democratization.  
During the past two decades, Taiwanese media has regularly ranked among Asia’s 
freest (Sullivan et al., 2018). Among other things, sensationalism and questionable ethical 
practices for instance (Wang and Cohen, 2009), the contemporary media environment in 
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Taiwan is characterized by abundance, fragmentation and multiplicity, which facilitates and 
requires new modes of political communication. To help situate the interdependencies 
between media and politics, and identify the effects they have on political communications, 
this article draws on the concepts of media logics, mediatisation and media hybridity. It then 
proceeds with an examination of the evolution of the media environment and the adaptive 
communication practices of political actors through a series of case studies on election 
campaigning, social movement activism and the “hybrid” campaign of “political outsider” Ko 
Wen-je (Ke Wenzhe 柯文哲 ), 2  which was notable for blending communication and 
organizational methods associated with both election campaigning and social movements. 
The article discusses the implications of generational change and shows how the expectations 
and behaviours of different age cohorts affect both the information environment and 
Taiwan’s political culture. Ultimately, the article concludes that the political communications 
environment is in a state of flux, as actors across Taiwanese society adapt to new methods 
and cultures in the production and dissemination of information. The co-evolution of politics 
and the media is not predetermined and does not produce linear outcomes. For instance, the 
popularization of digital media has had both “normalization” (the (re-)assertion of established 
hierarchical dynamics online) and “equalization” (reducing the power asymmetry between 
state and society) effects, often concurrently. This complexity requires a conceptual approach 
long missing in the literature on Taiwan, to which I now turn.  
 
Co-dependence of media and politics: Implications for political communication  
The major focus on political communications in Taiwan has been on election campaigning 
(Rawnsley, 2004; Schafferer, 2006), campaign advertising (Sullivan, 2009; Sullivan and 
Sapir, 2012), media ownership (Chiu and Chan-Olmsted, 1999; Rawnsley M. and Feng, 2014) 
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and advances in government communications (Lee et al., 2005; Sullivan, 2013). Prior work 
has addressed the role of institutions (Rawnsley, 2003a), political culture (Mattlin, 2004), 
national identity (Hsu, 2014), party behaviour (Fell, 2005) and strategy (Sullivan and Sapir, 
2012). Missing in the literature on Taiwan is an overarching framework for identifying the 
connection between the changing media environment and political communications. Two 
approaches to theorizing the interaction between political and media institutions facilitate 
bridging this gap: media logics and mediatisation. 
Developed during the earlier “mass communication era,” when broadcast TV and 
newspapers were dominant (Prior, 2007), the media logic approach did much to elucidate 
how assumptions, norms and routines associated with the operation of mass media influenced 
political actors’ communication behaviours (Altheide, 1979). Political actors desiring 
influence over public discourse were compelled to adapt their communication strategies to fit 
the dominant formats required by mass media. Mass media norms like “newsworthiness” 
(Shoemaker, 2006) and a preference for visuals and drama led political actors to hire spin 
doctors, campaign specialists and to deal in soundbites. In short, political actors tailored their 
communications “to the needs of the mass media” (Swanson and Mancini, 1996: 1). 
Mediatisation differs from media logic in that it emphasizes systemic long-term interactions 
between the media and institutions across all sectors of society. Distinct from a pervasive and 
singular media logic, which conceives politics and the media interaction as a one-way 
relationship and thus focuses on political adaptation and responses to developments driven by 
the media, mediatisation embraces the idea that media and party logics coexist in a 
relationship characterised by complex interdependence (Hjarvard, 2013). Mediatisation thus 
goes beyond a focus on agenda setting, for example, to analyse the feedback loops between 
media, public opinion and political institutions, and the interpenetration of norms and 
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behaviours. Mediatisation scholars identify numerous interfaces between media and politics; 
and conceive this cross-permeation as dynamic and mutable (Strömbäck, 2008).   
The media environment in contemporary Taiwan is unrecognizably diverse, 
fragmented and profuse compared to the mass communication era (Sullivan et al. 2018). With 
over 300 cable and satellite TV channels, an internet penetration rate of 88%,3 and 29 million 
mobile phone subscriptions,4 economic competition and the proliferation of technology have 
created a significantly different communications environment for media and political 
institutions, and citizens. First, there has been a massive multiplication of “institutionalized 
structures, forms, formats and interfaces for disseminating symbolic content” (Couldry, 2012: 
viii). Keane (2013) characterizes the multiplication of media and high intensity media-use in 
people’s daily lives as “communicative abundance.” Second, there has been a shift in what 
we understand “media” to be. With the proliferation of multimedia platforms, social media 
and ubiquitous connectivity via WiFi and mobile data, distinctions between “print”, 
“broadcast” and “digital” are increasingly redundant: All forms of media are available 
anywhere, at any time, on any device, often via the same website or application, mixing, 
merging and blurring boundaries. Third, the potential for unlimited acts of mediated 
communication by anyone possessing a smartphone has altered behaviours and expectations 
to the extent that it represents “a fundamental shift in the way people interact with each other, 
obtain and process information, and ultimately use this information to choose who governs” 
(Gainous and Wagner, 2014: 1). Consider the differences in production, distribution and 
usage characteristic of the earlier era of mass communication and the “network logic” used to 
describe the structure of digital communications (Castells, 2011). Media production was once 
dominated by professional journalists and editors and distributed to a fee-paying audience of 
subscribers. These media gatekeepers are still there, but they have been joined by millions of 
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amateur content producers acting on their own preferences, free from professional constraints 
and often acting on the desire to maximize attention. Many traditional media institutions have 
adapted their practices and retain significant influence in the digital sphere (Howard and 
Hussain, 2011), but previously captive mass audiences are no longer limited to passively 
consuming professionally selected information. Through social media peer networks they can 
consume and share selectively, and become co- and post-creators through the “prosuming” 
inherent in hacking, mash-ups, memes, fan fiction and the manipulation of images and 
branding (Klinger and Svensson, 2015: 1246). 
Conditions of complexity, abundance and multi-directional interdependence have 
rendered the notion that a singular media logic is operative untenable (Chadwick, 2013).  
Instead, contemporary media-politics interactions require an examination of “an ensemble of 
simultaneously operative media logics” (Dahlgren, 2009: 54). Under the conditions of “media 
hybridity” (Chadwick, 2013) and “communicative abundance” (Keane, 2013), opinion 
leaders, politicians, activists and citizens engage in a new form of multidimensional, 
instantaneous communication with a potentially global reach. It is the massive agglomeration 
of these behaviours and the socio-cultural attitudes and expectations they inculcate (sharing, 
transparency, cynicism, lack of deference, incivility) that are creating a new political 
communications environment. Hybridity democratizes information by minimizing or 
disguising dichotomies between professional and amateur, while also creating dogmatic echo 
chambers and “rabbit holes of special interests” (Honan, 2014: 49). Communicative 
abundance gives everyone a voice, but also creates disorientating “information cascades” that 
overwhelm people with rumours, trivia and spin (Sunstein, 2009). Theoretically, everyone 
has access to everything, but in reality, secret commercial algorithms determine the 
information people are exposed to, malicious bots generate “fake news”, the most divisive 
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content goes viral and anonymous online discussions descend into abusive partisan trolling 
(Gainous and Wagner, 2014). 
In combination, these dynamics represent a major challenge to political 
communicators. Governments, parties and politicians have reduced control over what is said 
about them, by whom, and even the reproduction of their own words (Soroka, 2014: 75). On 
the other hand, the emergence of social media as a vehicle for unmediated communication 
has become established as a powerful means to reach voters and citizens directly. Infamously, 
in the guise of Donald Trump’s Tweets, it has enabled attacks on opponents, determination of 
the media agenda, and is pored over for hints about American economic and foreign policy 
(Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016). A former reality TV performer, a genre that has 
similarly exploited the affordances of hybrid media (Hill, 2014), Trump is an acute example 
of the changing parameters of political communications. While Taiwan has not, as yet, 
produced a Trump-like communicator (President Tsai Ing-wen’s 蔡英文 tweets are a model 
of decorum in comparison), there is evidence of the “interplay between celebrity culture and 
the presentational strategies adopted by politicians” (Wood et al, 2016: 581), not least in the 
rise of former presidents Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), and literal 
rock star Legislator Freddy Lim (Lin Changzuo 林昶佐). The celebritization of politics in 
Taiwan is not as “advanced” as in many western democracies, but it is likely to intensify as a 
result of both the incentive structure of the new political communications environment and 
declining public trust in elected officials and increasing “anti-politics” attitudes. Ko Wen-je’s 
presentational strategy of distancing himself from politics, using various media to construct 
the distinctive “Ko persona” (Yan and Heng, 2016) while attempting to appear “just like us” 
(despite his elite status as a famous surgeon) by travelling on public transport and eschewing 
the political correctness filter of the professional politician is one example.       
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Major party election campaigning 
Elections have played a major role in the consolidation of democracy in Taiwan, in terms of 
providing opportunities for the transfer of power, issue representation and promoting 
democratic norms (Chao and Myers, 2000; Lin et al. 1996; Wong, 2003). The confluence of 
top-down liberalization, grassroots political opposition, social demands and exogeneous 
shocks led to incremental democratization processes over a period of two decades 
culminating by the mid-1990s in a competitive multi-party system with elections held for 
offices from the village and township level up to the Legislature and Presidency (Rigger, 
2002; Tien and Chu 1996). Election campaigns have been an integral part and inescapable 
spectacle in Taiwanese politics for the past three decades (Fell, 2018). These communicative 
and mobilizational events represent “dynamic struggles between candidates to define the 
informational context for voters” (Carsey et al., 2007: 269). In contemporary campaigns these 
“struggles” operate simultaneously over different spheres: “Air wars” denoting television 
coverage and advertising, the “ground game” to mobilize volunteers and voters, and the use 
of polling and demographic analytics to target potential donors and increase turnout. Over 
time, the “struggle” has increasingly moved online into cyberspace. Within the contemporary 
campaign the interplay of modes of communication creates a cross-fertilizing ecosystem 
characterised by hybridity. Taiwanese elections are characterised by a mixture of traditional 
and “post-modern” communication efforts (Sautede and Liddell, 2000), a process of 
hybridisation “that allows formal institutions and traditional methods to absorb and coexist 
with new and streamlined techniques of delivering the desired message” (Rawnsley 2003a: 
779). 
Prior to the launch of the 24-hour news channels in 1994, election campaigning in 
Taiwan was dominated by traditional practices like flag planting, posters, sound trucks, social 
events, rallies and hustings (Mattlin, 2004). But when cable news channels gave candidates 
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potential access to voters’ living rooms, name and face recognition, notoriety (mingqi 名氣) 
and personality became increasingly important to both the media and politicians. This focus 
on candidates (personality rather than policy) was a major driver of the “professionalization” 
of political communications in Taiwan (Rawnsley, 2003b). For instance, the first televised 
debates were held ahead of the 1994 Taipei Mayoral election, a campaign that marked the 
emergence of a more sophisticated type of campaigning led by DPP candidate Chen Shui-
bian’s team of creative consultants. In 2000, Chen’s presidential campaign featured a 
candidate-focused, “soft sell” image-building campaign that privileged his celebrity over the 
DPP’s policy program (Rigger, 2001). 
With the advent of cable TV, footage of rallies, motorcades and sound-bites appeared 
regularly alongside campaign and stump speeches. Large rallies became the major televisual 
set pieces of the campaign, cast as spectacles with musical interludes, extravagant staging and 
rousing speeches. More recently, teleprompters, computer-generated graphics and celebrity 
performing artists have become routine. Parties now invest substantial resources in in-house 
polling to monitor and test the effectiveness of their messaging and as content to supply to the 
media. Parties place newspaper ads that look like official polls to increase turnout (Sullivan, 
2008) and to “lend the authority of ‘news’ to the factual claims of the political ad” (Scammel 
and Langer, 2006: 771). Specialist communication consultants and data professionals are 
increasingly involved in candidates’ campaigns, distancing them from the central party 
organization. The communication methods used by Taiwanese candidates and parties have 
multiplied and diversified, and “candidates who can afford it use every platform available” 
(Rawnsley, 2004: 219). Newer practices adopted in Taiwan have added layers of complexity 
to campaigns, with substantial repurposing, reinvention and “cross-cultural raids” (Chadwick, 
2006: 29). Traditional electioneering practices like street canvassing (saojie 掃街 ) and 
community meet-and-greets have been repurposed as multimedia content for candidates’ 
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social media. Larger scale campaign events (zaoshi 造勢) are broadcast by candidates and 
parties directly on video streaming platforms. Formal campaign rallies with “passionate 
speeches and political stunts taking place in front of huge crowds” (Schafferer 2006: 52) 
remain part of the traditional and televisual campaign, but as media consumers have 
increasingly moved online (Su, 2010), rallies now also stream live (to a global audience) on 
social media.5  
Internet campaigning appeared in Taiwan during the first direct election for Taipei 
Mayor in 1994, when candidate Chen Shui-bian launched an online discussion forum. It 
proved sufficiently popular, especially on university campuses, that by the time of the 
legislative elections in 1995 the major parties had all established websites. Systematic polling 
was introduced ahead of the presidential election in 1996 and featured on the five candidates’ 
campaign websites. These rudimentary efforts were used solely for one-way dissemination of 
information. Interactive features appeared for the first time ahead of the 2000 presidential 
election, with Chen Shui-bian’s website inviting voters to submit ideas for Cabinet selections, 
make campaign donations online and purchase A-bian (阿扁 ) branded merchandise 
(Rawnsley, 2003b: 9). As President, Chen conversed with citizens online, an innovation taken 
up by candidates for the 2002 Mayoral elections, many of which built chat rooms into their 
personal websites. Ma Ying-jeou, then standing for re-election as Taipei Mayor, pioneered 
multimedia content on his website, including video images of himself swimming and jogging 
in a successful attempt to cultivate a healthy and vigorous image. His DPP opponent Li 
Yingyuan (李應元) also included video and Flash games on his campaign site. The trend 
towards personalization accelerated with the adoption of personal blogs, led by then-
legislator Luo Wenjia’s (羅文嘉) blog (Woshi Luo Wenjia我是羅文嘉) established in 2005. 
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Through mid-decade many politicians progressed from homepages to blogs and nascent 
social media. Of the 126 representatives serving in the Seventh Legislative Yuan from 2008, 
70% tried their hand at blogging (Sullivan, 2010). Standing for Taipei Mayor in 2006, Frank 
Hsieh (Xie Changting 謝長廷) ran his campaign through his blog, eschewing a campaign 
website altogether.  
After the DPP’s heavy defeats in 2008 presidential and legislative elections, and 
former president Chen’s conviction on corruption charges, the party enthusiastically adopted 
social media to reconnect with voters. In 2009 Frank Hsieh published a book (translated as 
“Frank's Plurk Diary”) based on the messages he posted on the Plurk social network site,6 
priming Taiwan for its first “social media campaign” ahead of the 2010 special municipality 
elections. Campaigning for Taipei and Xinbei City respectively, the DPP’s Su Tseng-chang 
(Su Zhenchang蘇貞昌) and Tsai Ing-wen set up Facebook pages that accumulated around 
one hundred thousand likes. Su created a dedicated social media team, a first for a Taiwanese 
election candidate, while Tsai also organized a separate digital communications team. 
Previously these functions were conducted under the party’s culture and communications unit. 
Both candidates lost but maintained their Facebook pages through the DPP primary for 
presidential nomination. Seeing the success of Su and Tsai’s Facebook pages, President Ma, 
who would run against one of them for re-election, established his own account in December 
2010. It soon surpassed one hundred thousand likes and included such enticements as an 
application for joining a band and playing a virtual song with the president. Ma was effective 
at integrating his social media presence, including an active YouTube channel for delivering 
unmediated personal video messages, into the government communications infrastructure 
(Sullivan, 2013). Ma wrote on Facebook that “it is the government’s responsibility to let the 
                                                          
6 See http://reut.rs/guCGBE. Xie’s Plurk feed is accessible at www.plurk.com/frankcthsieh. 
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people clearly understand it’s policy ideas […] wherever the people are the government 
should be too.”7  
In dozens of interviews conducted with Taiwanese politicians, digital media is 
invoked time and again as the key to reaching young people, an increasingly influential 
voting cohort that parties perceive as less ingrained partisans and thus more open to 
persuasive communication efforts. Per capita usage of Facebook in Taiwan is among the 
highest in the world,8 and it is cheaper than other media and often more effective in driving 
media attention than formal communiques (Wen, 2013). It also enables rapid response, for 
rebutting attacks or redressing media stories or unfavourable framing. Politicians explain that 
social media is important for giving the appearance of direct communication and interactivity 
with voters. Politicians have also found “humanizing” effects and greater message control in 
“the evolution from blogs to YouTube” (Tso, 2014: 173), circumventing the media initially 
by producing personal videos, which are sometimes then remediated by news channels. 
Shareable multi- and social media content with personal, emotional, funny or behind-the-
scenes has a greater chance of going viral and delivering the benefits of internet “buzz”: 
substantial audiences, organic grassroot energy and media pick up.  
Politicians often use social media to seed ideas for journalists who scour the internet 
for stories, either through issuing robust opinion on opponents or contemporary events, or by 
creating content resonating with human interest, personality and emotion. As a candidate for 
the presidency in 2012, Tsai Ing-wen leveraged a cute human-interest story (young twins 
offering their piggybank savings, which the KMT pointed out would technically be a 
campaign finance infraction) into a wildly successful campaign to collect donations. Social 
media statistics in the form of likes and follows are a useful indicator of popularity and are 
                                                          
7 My translation of 民眾清楚知道政府的施政理念，是政府的責任  […] 民眾在哪裡，政府就在哪裡 . 
http://www.facebook.com/MaYingjeou Accessed 6th Feb 2011. 
8 Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/295611/taiwan-social-network-penetration/  
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used as a source of data for tailoring the message, in effect a huge focus group letting 
campaigns see what policies and messages resonate.  
Social movement activism 
Grassroots, citizen-led social movements re-emerged in Taiwan during Ma Ying-jeou’s first 
term, reflecting discontent across diverse social sectors prompted by a range of discrete issues 
(Fell, 2017).9 The resurgence of protest activism coincided with breakthroughs in digital 
communications, including the popularization of smartphones and the launch of Facebook’s 
traditional Chinese platform in 2008 (Hsiao, 2018). Ma’s assumption of presidency in May 
2008 ushered in an era of conservative government that threatened progressive reform 
achievements. Student movements, dormant since the Wild Lily Movement in 1990, 
reappeared with the outbreak of the Wild Strawberry Movement in November 2008. The 
revival of student protests began in response to perceived excessive policing surrounding the 
visit of a Chinese envoy and was initiated by a single post by an activist professor on 
Taiwan’s largest bulletin board system, PTT (Hsiao, 2017: 39).10 The use of digital media as 
a mobilizing channel compensated for the long-term decline of campus clubs and student 
associations which had sustained movement participation in the 1990s. Although the Wild 
Strawberry Movement eventually failed to elicit responses from the government, it nurtured a 
cohort of digital-savvy student activists who made up the core leadership in the subsequent 
Anti Media Monopoly and Sunflower Movements.  
The Anti Media Monopoly Movement arose in response to pro-Chinese conglomerate 
Want Want Group’s attempt to increase capacity in Taiwan’s print and cable sectors, and to 
expand operations as a content producer and service provider. Having acquired the venerable 
China Times newspaper in 2008, and radically altered its editorial line (Rawnsley and Feng 
                                                          
9 Large-scale popular demonstrations and marches in 2004 and 2006 were led by political parties and politicians 
10 Taiwan is unusual in the continuing popularity, especially among students, of bulletin board systems, simple 
text-based discussion forums that emerged in the early days of the web (Hsiao, 2018: 3464)  
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2014: 107–108), Want Want proposed purchasing China Network System (CNS, 中嘉), a 
major cable TV provider, and Taiwan Next Media (Yi Chuan Mei 壹傳媒), a popular tabloid. 
The acquisition would have given Want Want a substantial share of Taiwan’s media market. 
As the Ma administration signalled support for Want Want, civic groups organizing via 
online networks joined student events under the aegis of the “Anti Media Monster Youth 
Alliance” (Fan meiti jushou qingnian lianmeng反媒體巨獸青年聯盟), which subsequently 
evolved into the Anti Media Monopoly Movement (Fan meiti longduan yundong反媒體壟
斷運動). A grassroots online campaign was complemented by campaigners traveling around 
Taiwan to address crowds at markets and transport hubs, combining online and physical 
space (Rawnsley and Feng, 2014: 107). The movement was ultimately successful, influencing 
the National Communications Commission decision to reject Want Want’s proposed 
acquisitions and leading to a draft Anti Media Monopoly Act (Fan meiti longduan fa反媒體
壟斷法). The movement involved not only contention over media, but also the younger 
generation’s defence of Internet freedom. Prior to the summer of 2012, the opposition to the 
Want Want’s expansion bid was primarily led by a small group of scholars without attracting 
a mass following. The misguided decision by Want Want to file a libel suit against Chen 
Wei-ting (陳為廷 ), a student leader, over a Facebook post, sent a shockwave through 
Taiwan’s student population, which feared that social media platforms were being monitored 
by a pro-China media organization. The anti-Want Want campaign thus evolved into a bona 
fide student movement with large-scale rallies and disruptive protests, which increased 
political pressure on government officials and set a precedent for further mobilizations. 
Further social movements were inspired by the death of Hung Chung-chiu (Hong 
Zhongqiu 洪仲丘), a national service recruit whose physical punishment for bringing a smart 
phone onto base ended in fatality. His death was suppressed by the army, until a small 
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number of concerned people initiated an internet campaign on PTT, which evolved into a 
physical protest organized by the Citizen 1985 Action Alliance (Gongmin 1985 xingdong 
lianmeng 公民 1985行動聯盟; “1985” being the Ministry of National Defence complaints 
line). An initial demonstration attracted thirty thousand people, greatly eclipsed by another 
march after Hung’s funeral which saw 250,000 people gather in Taipei. Citizen 1985 Action 
Alliance was started by a small number of middle class professionals with no political or 
activist experience who met by chance online. Non-partisan, youth-led, sharing knowledge 
and skills and using digital tools for internal and external communications, fundraising and 
mobilization, Citizen 1985 illustrated how “Taiwan’s civil movement has entered into a new 
phase and has adopted a new mode of internet-empowered social movements” (Hung, 2014: 
73).  
 This new mode was evident in the subsequent outpouring of discontent manifest in 
the Sunflower Movement in 2014. The student occupation of the legislature exemplified both 
the mobilizing power of new modes of communication and the hybridity inherent in a 
movement that was launched and maintained online at the same time as it was operating in 
physical space. As Castells describes the Occupy Wall Street movement, so the occupation of 
the Legislative Yuan was “a hybrid networked movement [linking] cyberspace and urban 
space in multiple forms of communication” (Castells, 2011:177). Social media were crucial 
to the initial mobilization of students, to the crafting of a self-mediated narrative, to put 
demands to the Ma government and communicate to the watching world. Digital platforms 
were used for generating the logistical support needed to sustain the occupation, and to 
protect the students from potential violent interventions by the authorities. The occupiers self-
mediated through a livestream, while collaborative online multimedia workspace and 
constant social media updates that allowed them to tell their side of the story without 
refractions by traditional media, of which the occupiers were highly suspicious (Rowen, 2015: 
16 
 
1). In the first few hours after students entered the legislature, a software engineer set up a 
makeshift broadcasting station with his cell phone, iPad, and a pair of sandals which were 
used to shore up the tablet, which later evolved into a full-scale intervention by g0v.tw 
(Lingshi Zhengfu 零時政府 ), a freeware activists’ organization founded in 2012. 11  The 
g0v.tw programmers orchestrated a powerful online platform that not only provided real-time 
images inside and outside of the occupied legislature, but also helped to coordinate logistical 
efforts in terms of material donations and distribution of manpower over the duration of the 
sustained confrontation with the authorities. 
One episode during the Sunflower Movement illustrated the power of hybrid media. 
Internet activists worried about public opinion and the generational digital divide since they 
found Taiwan’s older citizens were not receiving online information and were thus more 
likely to be influenced by pro-government TV stations and newspapers. They thus decided to 
raise funds via online crowdfunding websites to buy advertising space in the major domestic 
newspapers. Taiwan’s first political crowdfunding campaign turned out to be a phenomenal 
success, amassing NT$6.3 million (US$200,000) from 3,621 donors within three hours, more 
than four times their planned goal. These contributions funded three waves of local 
newspaper advertisements plus an additional pamphlet and even a full-page advertisement in 
the New York Times on March 29. Sunflower participants were thus able to leverage their 
advantage in digital media to shore up their weakness in traditional media outlets. 
Like Occupy Wall Street, the occupied legislative chamber was “a space of 
conviviality, debate and autonomy” mutually constituted by the merging of hybrid space-
places online and in the physical world (Castells, 2011:168), and symbolized by the Island 
Sunrise anthem recorded by the Taiwanese band Fire Extinguisher (Miehuoqi 滅火器) inside 
                                                          
11  The organization describes itself as “a decentralized civic tech community from Taiwan” that 
advocates “transparency of information and build[s] tech solutions for citizens to participate in public affairs 
from the bottom up”. Available at: https://g0v.tw/zh-TW/  
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the occupied Parliament building (Wang, 2017). After the resolution of the occupation, the 
New Power Party (NPP, Shidai Liliang 時代力量) evolved as a de facto political successor to 
the movement (Ho, 2018), competing in the 2016 legislative elections and joining a 
parliamentary majority on the progressive side of the political spectrum after winning 5 seats. 
After the DPP’s victory in presidential and legislative elections in 2016, many Sunflower 
activists took advantage of the favourable political opportunity structure to enter government 
(Ho, 2015; Rudakowska and Trojnar, 2016). Taiwan’s protest scene subsequently witnessed a 
noticeable transition, with conservative groups mobilizing against proposed DPP government 
reforms. As newcomers to movement politics, and generally representing an older 
demographic, conservative opponents of equal marriage rights for example, were 
disadvantaged in the prevailing communications environment. Anti-gay marriage protesters 
complained about “bullying” by hostile opponents on Facebook and other digital platforms, 
and generally ceded the online battlefield to younger, digital-savvy LGBT activists. They 
complained, too, about the purported liberal bias of TV and newspapers, which they said 
“under-reported” the size of anti-gay marriage rallies. Soon these conservative activists 
discovered that LINE, a Japanese instant communication app popular among older people, 
could be a useful channel to spread their messages. Unlike publicly accessible Facebook 
accounts, LINE was characterized by discrete chat groups based on invitation. The more 
decentralized and secluded communication design facilitated conservative mobilization, 
particularly since it was primarily led by Protestant pastors and Catholic priests who 
maintained close relationships with their followers. Here Taiwan’s media hybridity gave rise 
to a fractured scene, as different tendencies attempted to capitalize on their most favourable 
information channel. Taiwan’s recent protest scene reveals the multifaceted entanglement 




The hybrid campaign of a political outsider 
Election campaigns run by major parties increasingly act as though they are selling the 
candidate like a brand or product, with voters imagined as customers. Image and emotions are 
frequently privileged over policy because candidates who “speak the language of emotion 
have a better chance of connecting with the electorate than those who do not” (Jerit, 2004: 
566). Candidates are urged by campaign consultants to repeat a small number of simple 
talking points, believing that simple cues have “greater salience and inferential power than 
more detailed messages” (Tessin, 2007). The quality of the information environment, 
enriched by the multiplicity of channels and content, has been degraded by these features of 
professional campaigning. For example, although candidates have incorporated digital 
communication tools with horizontal, interactive and participatory affordances, they are being 
used as “instruments that can be harnessed in new ways to work on behalf of the campaign” 
(Stromer-Galley, 2013: 12). Instead of offering real participation in campaigns, use of 
interactive widgets, social media and associated rhetoric merely create a simulacrum of 
interactivity. Ostensibly participatory tools are new ways to achieve the traditional goals of 
raising money and increasing turn out in targeted districts and cohorts. Contemporary 
democratic election campaigns thus tend to be top-down, data-driven exercises in “structured 
interactivity” (Kreiss, 2012).  
The priorities of many electorates have also changed over time, putting greater 
importance on “post-material” issues associated with lifestyle rather than material wellbeing 
and physical security (Inglehart, 1997). In post-industrial societies, “lifestyle politics” 
connected to issues like the environment, housing, consumption and recreation have 
increased in salience, with greater emphasis on identity, representation and expression among 
individuals and groups challenging the legitimacy of hierarchical political elites (Bennett, 
1998). Further realignments on the political left and right in response to economic recession, 
19 
 
austerity and the fallout from globalization across advanced democracies has given rise to 
numerous “non-traditional” political movements and candidates, from Spain’s Podemos to 
the Tea Party in the US and En Marche in France. Heterogeneous candidates in diverse 
contexts (from Beppe Grillo in Italy to Bernie Sanders in the US and Jeremy Corbyn in the 
UK) have in common a strong digital campaign, netroots support and citizen-initiated 
campaigning to facilitate “community building, getting out the vote, generating resources and 
message production” (Gibson, 2015: 187). As an antidote to disempowering “structured” 
election campaigns, numerous grassroots “outsider” candidates have challenged the 
campaigning methods of traditional major parties, learning and adopting the mobilizational 
methods commonly associated with social movements. Taiwan’s own “outsider” candidate, 
Ko Wen-je, a surgeon and media commentator, won the Taipei City Mayoral election as a 
DPP-endorsed independent in 2014. Ko was emblematic of an anti- “politics-as-usual” 
candidate, and his disruption of established major party competitors was well-served by a 
hybrid digital media campaign. Running against a KMT candidate in what is regarded a KMT 
stronghold, Ko’s indifference to politicking and commitment to transparency captured the 
post-Sunflower Movement Zeitgeist. Both candidates were political neophytes, but whereas 
Sean Lien’s (Lian Shengwen 連勝文) gaffes made him look like an ignorant young princeling, 
Ko’s unfiltered verbal faux pas were interpreted by his supporters as indicative of a non-
politician’s “authenticity”.12 While Lien used his superior resources to fund attack ads, Ko 
delivered his vision for a better functioning and more participatory city free from the malice 
and machinations of partisan politics, proposing improved social security, affordable housing 
and food safety. The manifesto he released online in the final week of the campaign, in 
response to his opponent’s criticism about empty rhetoric, was painstakingly detailed. 
                                                          
12 For instance, while Lien’s ignorance of basic facts about the geography of Taipei was interpreted as evidence 
of being out of touch (Hsiao, 2014), Ko’s sexist dismissal of a female election candidate and gynaecologists was 
framed as the unpolished plain speaking of a political outsider (Loa, 2014) 
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Ko’s campaign was notable for several features. First, he eschewed traditional 
campaign methods, refusing to produce usually ubiquitous campaign paraphernalia like flags 
and signs, and foregoing physical-space campaign rallies, a long-time staple of Taiwanese 
campaigns. Second, his campaign team made digital media the major battleground, 
marshalling young volunteers, soliciting online donations and crowd-sourcing policy inputs. 
Third, Ko’s campaign was, in Taiwanese terms, radically transparent. When Lien accused the 
campaign of financial irregularities, Ko posted complete records online. Fourth, Ko distanced 
his campaign from big business and stopped fundraising once he reached the stipulated 
limit— unheard of for Taiwanese candidates. The “Ko-P phenomenon” (Yan and Heng, 2016: 
300), 13  based on progressive policies, transparency and grassroots mobilization, applied 
mobilization techniques characteristic of social movements and generated the kind of organic 
“Yes, we can” buzz that surrounded Barack Obama’s campaign for US President in 2008. In 
his victory speech and in interview with the author, Ko was unequivocal about the 
contribution of digital media as the driving force of his campaign.  
As Taipei Mayor, Ko has retained a social media team and continued to use digital 
media to engage Taipei citizens, drive traditional media coverage and frame his governance 
efforts. And he has retained relatively high levels of public support despite continued faux 
pas, including remarks that could be interpreted as sexist and racist, and losing the support of 
the DPP following a series of mixed signals about Taiwanese identity. Despite fluctuations in 
public opinion polls, Ko’s “brand” has so far proven to be surprisingly resilient. With his 
trademark black trousers, short-sleeve shirt with a pen in the pocket and gold rimmed glasses, 
Ko’s non-descript image (riding the Taipei subway Ko is indistinguishable from a software 
engineer or middle school teacher) is the essence of “just like us”, a presentation strategy 
used by politicians and celebrities (Kane and Patapan, 2012; Turner, 2013). As a successful 
                                                          
13 “Ko-P” refers to Ko’s designation by students in his former role as medical professor. 
21 
 
social media communicator, Ko and his team produces content for a multiplicity of different 
media and embraces the likelihood that material may be repurposed by supporters and 
opponents. He routinely interacts with citizens, streams on Facebook Live and is unafraid of 
putting himself in embarrassing situations, like filming silly videos with Internet celebrity 
(wanghong 網紅) Tsai A-ga (Cai Aga 蔡阿嘎), in order to reach youth audiences.  
Political communications and generational change 
One of the major developments in Taiwanese society, thus-far unexamined in the context of 
political communications, is generational change. In the cases described above, party efforts 
to develop online campaigning were primarily driven by the hope of reaching younger voters; 
largescale social mobilizations since 2008 were organized by young people; and the 
dynamism of Ko Wen-je’s election campaign was in large part generated by the enthusiasm 
of young volunteers and supporters. A generation gap has emerged in Taiwanese society in 
terms of national identity, socio-economic opportunities and political attitudes (Le Pesant, 
2011; Liu and Li, 2017; Zhang et al, 2005). Common to many societies, a similar generation 
gap exists in attitudes and usage patterns of newer technologies and the internet (Salkowitz, 
2008), not least because young Taiwanese have long exhibited very high levels of internet 
usage and technological competency (Ishii and Wu, 2006). Media use varies by age cohort, 
not merely in the type of media consumed, but in the attitudes and expectations that are 
nurtured by the practices, affordances and norms associated with different media. This has 
the dual effect of incentivizing political actors to adapt and diversify their methods of 
communication, and changes users’ (i.e. citizens and voters) expectations and behaviours.  
The legacy of one party rule and instrumental quasi-Confucian discourses (Chang, 
2009: 44-5) did not expire with the coming of elections. Political elites retained their sense, 
and carefully framed narrative, about knowing what was best for the people. Many, 
particularly older citizens, conditioned by decades of priming through the media and 
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education systems, continued to have a narrow understanding of what democracy meant, 
sometimes complaining to pollsters that democracy was too messy, divisive and complicated. 
Political scientist Tianjian Shi (2014) argued that many Taiwanese came to understand 
democracy via the idea of minben (民本), a restricted form of government by benevolent 
elites that he labelled “guardianship democracy”.14 While survey research shows some older 
Taiwanese still hold to this idea, younger cohorts that have grown up with norms like 
freedom of speech, accountability and transparency, have different expectations (Dalton and 
Shin, 2014). The challenge to the foundations of “guardian democracy” is magnified by the 
popularization of digital and social media and the norms associated with Taiwan’s deeply 
embedded internet culture, where there is little deference to authority or patience for 
grandstanding and politicking in the face of the huge socio-economic challenges facing 
Taiwanese youth. One of Ko’s major selling points was his refusal to engage in political 
theatre and attack politics, along with his “authenticity” and commitment to transparency; 
positions that were communicated directly through his own digital channels rather than 
mainstream media. The case of another mode of political communication demonstrates why 
this resonated.   
Once at the cutting edge of political communications in Taiwan and a staple of 
primetime cable news schedules in the 1990s and early 2000s (Chu, 2004), political call-in 
shows (kouyingxiu 扣應秀) are now the preserve of older viewers. When Taiwan’s media 
market was liberalized, through deregulation of the newspaper market in 1989 and 
legalization of Cable TV in 1993, political TV coverage gradually moved away from issue-
oriented “hard news” to “soft news” and “infotainment” formats with greater mass appeal. 
The blurring of news and entertainment, with a significant dose of sensationalism and 
partisanship, created a hybrid form of “reality” and “performance” (Fell, 2007) manifest in 
                                                          
14 The western corollary, epistocracy (“rule by the wise”), has long been critiqued for leading to undemocratic 
outcomes (Runciman, 2018).  
23 
 
call-in shows representing most points on the ideological spectrum. Hosts determined the 
framing of an issue, often starting with a controversial question to be addressed by carefully 
selected guests, usually journalists, public intellectuals and politicians. The call-in circuit was 
lucrative for famous speakers (mingzui 名嘴), incentivising those with the personality and 
rhetorical eloquence to indulge in performative political theatrics. Orchestrated “saliva wars” 
(koushuizhan 口水戰) prompted the pejorative description of “putting on a show” (zuoxiu 作
秀) widely applied to Taiwanese politicians, some of whom gained celebrity via the call-in 
show circuit.15 Shows delivered ratings-driving scandals, often baseless, and fragmented into 
highly partisan outlets. Although some scholars argued that call-in shows provided a forum 
for deliberation and were a force for transparency and accountability (Lee, 2011: 64), the 
veneer of participation was a simulacrum of interactivity belied by scant opportunity for 
dialogue and railroaded by “call-in squadrons” organized by partisan surrogates and 
supporters. The positive potential of dialogic political programming was negated by 
excessive politicking and a “polarized public sphere” (Li, 2004). As TV audience figures 
declined,16 producers began to ditch the public participation element and most shows reverted 
to a studio format with discussion restricted to invited pundits, marking the victory of the 
self-contained “political talk show” (tanhuaxing zhenglun jiemu 談話性政論節目).  
The declining fortunes of the call-in format, itself a modern reboot of opposition 
pirate radio shows of the 1970s, coincided with the rise of digital and social media where 
much of the discussion has been displaced. While the level of dialogue between citizens and 
politicians remains low (Sullivan, 2010), the affordances for both ensure that social media, 
video sharing and streaming platforms and internet forums are the major site for political 
                                                          
15 KMT Legislator Qiu Yi (邱毅) revelled in the nickname “Master of the Exposé” (Baoliao Tianwang 爆料天
王) as he revealed the financial improprieties of President Chen, which led to the Million Voices against 
Corruption campaign (Baiwan renmin fantanfu daobian yundong 百萬人民反貪腐倒扁運動; also known as the 
Red Shirt campaign) (Shih, 2007).  
16  Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, http://www.ios.sinica.edu.tw/sc/cht/scDownload2.php#seventh, 
accessed on October 14, 2017. 
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communication with young people. Political actors recognize this, but they have discovered 
that this space, with its constant scrutiny, incivility, misinformation and scepticism, is a 
complex terrain to negotiate. For example, the subversion of the production of political 
imagery via user generated content has been a major challenge, as any politician who has had 
their campaign ads modified by Photoshop or seen a poorly worded statement or stumble 
become a meme can attest. Politicians are keen to harness this kind of voter engagement for 
their own mobilization purposes, but the nature of user generated content makes it 
unpredictable. The democratization of information production and dissemination, and the 
interplay of different media and viewpoints, create a rich information environment for voters, 
but one that is difficult for politicians to manage and harmful to whatever notion of the 
“benevolent and wise guardian” remains among the younger generation.  
 
Conclusion 
The hybrid media setting that is emerging in Taiwan is characterised by its complexity and 
heterogeneity, interdependence and transition. The dichotomies and power asymmetries that 
were once firmly embedded in the structures of Taiwanese politics and society are in flux and 
are generally being eroded. The gap between newer and older modes of political 
communication, traditional and online media, professional and amateur is getting smaller and 
a new system of co-evolving media, civil society and political spheres is taking shape. More 
fundamentally, actors who seek to influence public discourse are compelled to adopt modes 
of communication that are consistent with changing hybrid media demands. This represents a 
challenge to political actors in Taiwan. It also has implications for Taiwan’s political culture. 
Democracy theorists like Simon Tormey (2015) argue that representative democracy is 
changing as norms associated with the internet like openness, multiplicity, sharing, anarchy 
and abundance are internalized and shape citizens’ political cultural expectations. However, 
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while communicative abundance, democratization of information and constant public 
scrutiny have the potential to monitor public officials, they can also be corrupted (Keane, 
2009). The glut of media content and constant presence of media messages in Taiwan, from 
always-on TVs and via ubiquitous connected devices, means that Taiwanese daily lives are 
disrupted by a flow of mediated events where adversarial and sensationalist styles of 
commercial journalism make politics seem more dishonest than it is and reducing public trust. 
Tso (2014) argues that the reduction of distance between politicians and the people through 
constant mediation and a “permanent battlefield in cyberspace” led to the rapid decline in 
popularity of Ma Ying-Jeou and Chen Shui-bian. A similar rapid decline in support for Tsai 
Ing-wen soon after her landslide election victory in 2016 suggests that maintaining support 
under conditions of permanent scrutiny and the continuous mobilization of low-cost 
discontent online is difficult.  
Content hunger, driven by intense commercialization and over-saturation, has eroded 
the quality of Taiwan’s media through advertising-led business models that encourage 
sensationalism, click-bait and “churnalism.” Coverage of politics is obsessed with storylines 
and scandal, and guilty of producing “pseudo-news” that obfuscates the information 
environment available to citizens (Davies, 2011; Schudson, 2008). After a hesitant initial 
response, political actors in Taiwan have worked to re-assert their control of the information 
environment, often working with established media operations to exploit hybrid media logics. 
As co-elites in Taiwanese political culture, parties and the media share the incentive to adapt 
together to the new conditions, which they have done by slowly colonizing cyberspace and in 
continuing to influence public opinion through the broadcast and print media. Ultimately, 
“politicians recognize the power of the media in forming their reputations and, therefore, in 
making or breaking their political careers” (Rawnsley and Gong, 2011: 330). Keane (2013) 
describes this “symbiotic relationship” between politicians and producers as a component of 
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“media decadence”, where politicians seek to increase their name recognition by exploiting 
the communication space on offer from the media, and journalists seek scoops and inside 
information. However, deference to political authority and consequences for speaking truth to 
power have diminished. Whereas Chiang Kai Shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo were immune 
from scrutiny, in the democratic era “everyone including the president is fair game, and the 
private lives of Taiwan’s most prominent politicians are open to inspection and (the most 
damaging) speculation” (Rawnsley, 2004: 218). Ordinary citizens, like in the social 
movements described above, have in many cases used their expanded access to information 
and capacity to reach and mobilize large numbers of fellow citizens to uncover malfeasance 
and push for their rights.  
 
REFERENCES 
Altheide, David (1979). Media logic. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
Barr, Robert (2009). “Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment politics.” Party 
Politics 15(1): 29-48. 
Bennett, W. Lance (1998). “Lifestyle politics and citizen-consumers: Identity, 
communication and political action in late modern society.” In Media and Political Style: 
Essays on Representation and Civic Culture, Corner, J. and Pels, D. Eds. London: Sage. 137-
150.  
Carsey, Thomas, Robert Jackson, Melissa Stewart and James Nelson (2011). “Strategic 
candidates, campaign dynamics, and campaign advertising in gubernatorial races.” State 
Politics & Policy Quarterly 11(3): 269-298. 
Castells, Manuel (2011). The Rise of the Network Society. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
27 
 
Chadwick, Andrew (2006). Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication 
Technologies. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Chadwick, Andrew (2013). The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Chadwick, Andrew, and Jennifer Stromer-Galley (2016). “Digital media, power, and 
democracy in parties and election campaigns: Party decline or party renewal?” International 
Journal of Press/Politics 21(3): 283-293. 
Chang, Bi-yu (2015). Place, Identity, and National Imagination in Post-war Taiwan. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Chao, Linda, and Ramon H. Myers (2000). “How elections promoted democracy in Taiwan 
under martial law.” The China Quarterly 162: 387-409. 
Chiu, Peilin, and Sylvia Chan-Olmsted (1999). “The impact of cable television on political 
campaigns in Taiwan.” Gazette 61(6): 491-509. 
Chu, Alice (2004). “Taiwan's mass-mediated 'crisis discourse': pop politics in an era of 
political TV call-in shows”, in Jordan, David, Andrew Morris, and Marc Moskowitz 
(eds.) The Minor Arts of Daily Life: Popular culture in Taiwan. Honolulu, University of 
Hawaii Press: 89-109. 
Couldry, Nick (2012). Media, Society, World: Social theory and digital media practice. 
London: Polity. 
Dahlgren, Peter (2009). Media and Political Engagement. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Dalton, Russell, and Doh Chull Shin (2014). “Growing up democratic: Generational change 
in East Asian democracies.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 15(3): 345-372. 
28 
 
Davies, Nick (2011). Flat Earth News. New York: Random House. 
Fell, Dafydd (2005). Party Politics in Taiwan. Party change and the democratic evolution of 
Taiwan, 1991-2004.  London: Routledge. 
Fell, Dafydd (2007). “Putting on a show and electoral fortunes in Taiwan’s multi-party 
elections.” In Strauss, J. and D. Cruise O'Brien (eds) Staging Politics: Power and 
Performance in Asia and Africa. London: IB Tauris. 133-150. 
Fell, Dafydd, (ed.) (2017). Taiwan’s Social Movements Under Ma Ying-jeou. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
Fell, Dafydd (2018). Government and Politics in Taiwan. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Gainous, Jason, and Kevin Wagner. (2014). Tweeting to Power: The Social Media Revolution 
in American Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gibson, Rachel (2015). “Party change, social media and the rise of ‘citizen-initiated’ 
campaigning.” Party Politics 21(2): 183-197. 
Hill, Annette (2014). Reality TV. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Hjarvard, Stig (2013). The Mediatization of Culture and Society. New York: Routledge. 
Ho, Ming-sho (2015). “Occupy congress in Taiwan: Political opportunity, threat, and the 
Sunflower Movement.” Journal of East Asian Studies 15(1): 69-97. 
Ho, Ming-sho (2018). “From protest to electioneering: Electoral and party politics after the 
Sunflower Movement.” In Jonathan Sullivan and Chun-yi Lee (eds) A New Era in 
Democratic Taiwan: Trajectories and Turning Points in Politics and Cross-Strait Relations.  
Abingdon, Routledge: 95-115. 
Honan, Mat (2014). “Fear and Liking on Facebook.” Wired, November. 
29 
 
Howard, Philip and Muzammil Hussain (2011). “The role of digital media.” Journal of 
democracy 22(3): 35-48. 
Hsiao, Alison (2014). “Lien target of more ridicule after fresh gaffe.” July 30: 3. 
Hsiao, Yuan (2017). “Virtual Ecologies, Mobilization and Democratic groups without leaders: 
impacts of Internet media on the Wild Strawberry Movement.” In Fell, D. (ed) Taiwan’s 
Social Movements under Ma Ying-jeou. London: Routledge. 34-53. 
Hsiao, Yuan (2018). “Understanding digital natives in contentious politics: Explaining the 
effect of social media on protest participation through psychological incentives.” New Media 
& Society 20(9): 3457–78. 
Hsu, Chien-Jung (2014). The Construction of National Identity in Taiwan's Media, 1896-
2012. Leiden: Brill. 
Hung, Chin-fu (2014). “The internet and Taiwan’s new civic movement in the information 
age: Hung Chung-chiu’s case.” Asiascape: Digital Asia 1(1/2): 54-77. 
Inglehart, Ronald (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and 
Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Ishii, Kenichi, and Chyi-In Wu (2006). “A comparative study of media cultures among 
Taiwanese and Japanese youth.” Telematics and Informatics 23(2): 95-116. 
Jerit, Jennifer (2004). “Survival of the fittest: Rhetoric during the course of an election 
campaign.” Political Psychology 25(4): 563-575. 
Kane, John, and Haig Patapan (2012). The Democratic Leader: How democracy defines, 
empowers and limits its leaders. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Keane, John (2009). The Life and Death of Democracy. London: Simon and Schuster. 
30 
 
Keane, John (2013). Democracy and Media Decadence. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Klinger, Ulrike, and Jakob Svensson (2015). “The emergence of network media logic in 
political communication: A theoretical approach.” New Media & Society 17(8): 1241-1257. 
Kreiss, Daniel. (2012). Taking Our Country Back: The Crafting of Networked Politics from 
Howard Dean to Barack Obama. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Le Pesant, Tanguy (2011). “Generational change and ethnicity among 1980s-born 
Taiwanese.” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 40(1): xx-xx 
Lee, Sang, Xin Tan, and Silvana Trimi (2005). “Current practices of leading e-government 
countries.” Communications of the ACM 48(10): 99-104. 
Lin, Tse-min, Yun-han Chu, and Melvin Hinich (1996). “Conflict displacement and regime 
transition in Taiwan: A spatial analysis.” World Politics 48(4): 453-481. 
Liu, Frank C. and Yitan Li 2017. “Generation matters: Taiwan’s perceptions of mainland 
China and attitudes towards cross-Strait trade talks.” Journal of Contemporary China 26(104): 
263-279. 
Loa Iok-sin (2014). “Gaffe-prone Ko Wen-je answers sexism charge”. Taipei Times, Sept 9: 
3. 
Mattlin, Mikael (2004). “Nested pyramid structures: Political parties in Taiwanese elections.” 
The China Quarterly 180: 1031-49. 
Marsh, David, Paul ‘T. Hart, and Karen Tindall (2010). “Celebrity politics: The politics of 
the late modernity?” Political Studies Review 8(3): 322-340. 
31 
 
Prior, Markus (2007). Post-broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality 
in Political Involvement and Polarizes Elections. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rawnsley, Gary (2003a). “An institutional approach to election campaigning in 
Taiwan.” Journal of Contemporary China 12(37): 765-779. 
Rawnsley, Gary (2003b). “A severe case of athlete’s foot: Democratisation and election 
campaigning in Taiwan.” University of Nottingham Working Paper. 
Rawnsley, Gary (2004). “Treading a fine line: Democratisation and the media in 
Taiwan.” Parliamentary Affairs 57(1): 209-222. 
Rawnsley, Gary, and Qian Gong (2011). “Political communications in democratic Taiwan: 
The relationship between politicians and journalists.” Political Communication 28(3): 323-
340. 
Rawnsley, Ming-yeh and Feng, Chien-San (2014). “Anti–media-monopoly policies and 
further democratisation in Taiwan.” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 43(3): 105–128. 
Rigger, Shelley (2001). From Opposition to Power: Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Rigger, Shelley (2002) Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Reform. New York, Routledge. 
Rowen, Ian (2015). “Inside Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement.” Journal of Asian Studies 74(1): 
1-15. 
Rudakowska, Anna, and Ewa Trojnar (2016). “Who is a Political Newcomer? The Taiwanese 
voters' perspective: 2016.” Hemispheres 31(3): 68-78. 
Runciman, David (2018). How Democracy Ends. New York: Basic Books. 
32 
 
Salkowitz, Rob (2008). Generation Blend: Managing across the technology age gap. New 
York: Wiley & Sons. 
Sautedé, Eric, and Philip Liddell (2000). “Electioneering Taiwan-style: The politics of 
personality and the push for change.” China Perspectives 29: 52-56. 
Schafferer, Christian (ed.) (2006). Election Campaigning in East and Southeast Asia: 
Globalization of Political Marketing. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing. 
Schudson, Michael (2008). Why Democracies Need an Unlovable Press. London: Polity. 
Shi, Tianjian (2014). The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Shoemaker, Pamela (2006). “News and newsworthiness.” Communications 31(1): 105-111. 
Soroka, Stuart (2014). Negativity in Democratic Politics: Causes and Consequences. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Strömbäck, Jesper (2008). “Four phases of mediatization: An analysis of the mediatization of 
politics.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 13(3): 228-246. 
Stromer-Galley, Jennifer (2013). Presidential Campaigning in the Internet Age. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Su, Chien-Chou (2010). “Media consumption in Taiwan: Mining the Shih Hsin 
communication database.” Asia Pacific Management Review 15(1): 113-131. 
Sullivan, Jonathan (2008). “Campaign advertising and democracy in Taiwan.” The China 
Quarterly196: 900-11. 
Sullivan, Jonathan (2009). “Defending negativity? Evidence from presidential campaigns in 
Taiwan.” East Asia: An International Quarterly 26(4): 305-18. 
33 
 
Sullivan, Jonathan (2010). “Legislators’ blogs in Taiwan.” Parliamentary Affairs 63(3): 471-
85. 
Sullivan, Jonathan (2013). “Electronic resources in the study of elite political behaviour in 
Taiwan.” The China Quarterly 203: 172-188. 
Sullivan, Jonathan, and Eliyahu V. Sapir (2012). “Modelling negative campaign advertising: 
evidence from Taiwan.” Asian Journal of Communication 22(3): 289-303. 
Sullivan, Jonathan, Ming-Yeh Rawnsley, Chien-san Feng and James Smyth (2018). “The 
media in democratic Taiwan”, in Sullivan, Jonathan, and Chun-Yi Lee, eds. A New Era in 
Democratic Taiwan: Trajectories and Turning Points in Politics and Cross-Strait Relations. 
Abingdon, Routledge: XX-XX 
Sunstein, Cass (2009). Republic.com 2.0. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Swanson, David and Paolo Mancini (1996). Politics, Media and Modern Democracy: An 
International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and Their Consequences. New 
York: Praeger. 
Tessin, Jeff (2007). “Cues given, cues received: How candidates use shortcuts when voters 
need them most.” Manuscript, Princeton University. 
Tien, Hung Mao, and Yun-han Chu (1996). “Building democracy in Taiwan.” The China 
Quarterly 148: 1141-1170. 
Tormey, Simon (2015). The End of Representative Politics. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Tso, Chen-dong (2014). “Digital media and the transformation of politics in Taiwan”. In L. 
Diamond and G. Shin, (Eds.) New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and 
Taiwan. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. 160-189. 
34 
 
Turner, Graeme (2013). Understanding Celebrity. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Wang, Chih-ming (2017). “‘The future that belongs to us’: Affective politics, neoliberalism 
and the Sunflower Movement.” International Journal of Cultural Studies 20(2): 177-192. 
Wang, Tai-Li, and Akiba Cohen (2009). “Factors affecting viewers’ perceptions of 
sensationalism in television news: A survey study in Taiwan.” Issues and Studies 45(2): 125-
157. 
Wen, Wei-Chun (2014). “Facebook political communication in Taiwan: 1.0/2.0 messages and 
election/post-election messages.” Chinese Journal of Communication 7(1): 19-39. 
Wong, Joseph (2003). “Deepening democracy in Taiwan.” Pacific Affairs 76(2): 235-256. 
Wood, Matthew, Jack Corbett, and Matthew Flinders (2016). “Just like us: Everyday 
celebrity politicians and the pursuit of popularity in an age of anti-politics.” The British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 18(3): 581-598. 
Yan, Ho-Don and Michael Heng (2016). “Political entrepreneurship and the Ko-P 
phenomenon in Taiwan’s democratization.” Asian Journal of Political Science 24(3): 285-
304. 
Zhang, Yan Bing, Mei-Chen Lin, Akihiko Nonaka and Khisu Beom (2005). “Harmony, 
hierarchy and conservatism: A cross-cultural comparison of Confucian values in China, 
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.” Communication Research Reports 22(2): 107-115. 
 
 
 
 
